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The Lowy Institute for International Policy is an independent policy think 
tank. Its mandate ranges across all the dimensions of international policy 
debate in Australia – economic, political and strategic – and it is not 
limited to a particular geographic region. Its two core tasks are to: 
• produce distinctive research and fresh policy options for Australia’s 
international policy and to contribute to the wider international debate. 
• promote discussion of Australia’s role in the world by providing an 
accessible and high-quality forum for discussion of Australian 
international relations through debates, seminars, lectures, dialogues 
and conferences. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The climate change negotiations are changing the global economy in 
ways that matter to Australia. New norms, standards, rules, and even 
laws will require Australia to change. These developments create 
challenges and opportunities for Australian businesses and individuals.  
Australia’s national circumstances — especially its relatively high current 
dependence on industries that emit large quantities of greenhouse gases 
— are distinctive, so Australia must work harder than others to advance 
its interests. Failure to pay proper, high-level attention to the negotiations 
would seriously endanger the national interest. By actively engaging in 
negotiations in a strategic and creative way, Australia can help ensure 
that the next global agreement provides a smooth adjustment for the 
global and the Australian economy. This would minimise potential 
adverse impacts on Australia, and secure access to the new economic 
and other opportunities that action on climate change brings. 
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In 2013, for the first time outside an election period, the Australian 
delegation to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) Conference of Parties (COP) was not led by a 
minister. Towards the end of 2013, Australian representatives preparing 
for hosting the 2014 G20 meeting in Brisbane told their counterparts that 
climate change would not be discussed in any depth. Australia resisted 
sustained calls, including from key partners such as the United States 
and the United Kingdom, to place climate change prominently on the 
agenda, instead characterising climate change as a distraction from the 
G20’s proper focus on jobs, economic growth, and trade.
1
 Australia 
remained firm until the meeting opened in Brisbane, where other 
countries effectively forced the issue onto the agenda and into the 
spotlight.  
Similarly, in September 2014, the Prime Minister chose not to attend the 
UN Secretary General’s Climate Summit, despite being in New York 
near the time, and despite its purpose being to build momentum towards 
a strong and effective global agreement at the United Nations Climate 
Conference in Paris at the end of 2015. The Summit was targeted at 
world leaders; around 100 heads of state and government attended. 
Prime Minister Abbott was clear about his reasons — at a media 
conference shortly before the Summit, he reportedly said climate change 
was “not the only or even the most important” international issue.
2
  
The Liberal National Party Coalition went to the 2013 election with a 
clear plan to overhaul Australia’s domestic policy on climate change, so 
the subsequent reforms came as no surprise.
3
 What was surprising, 
however, was the new government’s international approach. Previous 
Australian governments, of both political persuasions, and regardless of 
differences in the substance of their policies, have dealt with climate 
change as an important international issue requiring high-priority 
attention. Australia has consistently played a major role in multilateral 
climate negotiations, international forums, and leaders’ dialogues.
4
 And 
more recently, Australian public opinion has shifted in favour of more 
concerted action. The 2014 Lowy Institute Poll found a significant 
majority (63 per cent) agree that Australia “should be taking a leadership 
role on reducing emissions.”
5
 Only 28 per cent believe that “it should wait 
for an international consensus before acting.” This can be read as 
increasing support for active international engagement as much as for 
stronger domestic policy. 
The Government’s retreat came at the very time international 
negotiations were gaining momentum. In October 2014, European Union 
(EU) leaders agreed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 
40 per cent below 1990 levels by 2030. On the eve of the Brisbane G20 
meeting, the United States and China jointly announced their own 
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targets: China to slow and then halt growth in its emissions around 2030; 
the United States to reduce its emissions by 26-28 per cent below 2005 
levels by 2025. They also announced that they would strengthen 
bilateral cooperation on climate change and work together to secure an 
ambitious new agreement in Paris.
6
  
The Coalition has repeatedly stated its commitment to reducing 
Australia’s emissions by between 5 and 25 per cent below 2000 levels 
by 2020,
7
 and it will announce its post-2020 target by the middle of this 
year.
8
 But statements by ministers, including the Prime Minister, since 
the last election strongly suggest that a decision has already been made 
to restrict the 2020 target to the least ambitious end of the range (that is, 
5 per cent).
9
 Given that the conditions for moving beyond 5 per cent 
have been met,
10
 Australia may face a difficult task explaining its position 
to other parties to the UNFCCC — particularly given its strong assertion 
that, in this context: “We do what we say.”
11
 Further, against the 
background of the EU announcement and the US-China accord, a post-
2020 target as unambitious as 5 per cent is for 2020 will doubtless 
attract widespread and severe criticism. Australia could defend its 
position, but only if it is well and truly on the front foot in the climate 
negotiations, actively engaged in a constructive fashion.  
At the time of writing, the Government’s approach to the climate 
negotiations appeared to be changing, with its engagement increasing in 
intensity and profile. One area where Australia’s position had been 
widely seen as egregiously out of step with international thinking was 
financing. The Government’s repeated statements that it would not be 
contributing to the Green Climate Fund (GCF)
12
 were criticised both 
within Australia and internationally.
13
 The Government’s decision during 
the December 2014 Lima COP to contribute $200 million to the GCF 
removed the stigma of its previous position and directly enhanced the 
delegation’s standing at the COP.  
Foreign Minister Julie Bishop’s attendance at the COP may have made 
this shift possible, and her attendance marked an important change in 
itself. Yet the backroom wrangling that evidently took place to get her 
there (her first request to attend was reportedly rejected by the Prime 
Minister’s Office; her second request was approved on the condition 
Trade Minister Andrew Robb attended as a ‘climate chaperone’) 
evidences the Government’s abiding ambivalence to international 
climate change negotiations.
14
   
This Analysis focuses on the Government’s strength of engagement in 
international climate change negotiations, rather than its choice of 
emissions reduction targets, domestic policies and measures, or 
positions on specific international issues. While substance and process 
are inevitably informed by, and reflect, the same set of concerns, this 
Analysis contends that regardless of its domestic policy settings 
Australia would benefit from stronger international engagement. It 
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examines the broad risks arising from the tepid engagement in 
negotiations that characterised the Government’s first year in office, and 
the rewards that might flow from more vigorous participation in future 
negotiations. It also considers how Australia might reclaim its position of 
influence at the international climate change negotiating table.  
WHY INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS 
MATTER  
The UNFCCC may be central to the global response to climate change 
but it does not enjoy a good press. It is widely seen as a talk-fest, and a 
polarised one at that. Progress is certainly slow, as is inevitable for any 
group of 195 where all decisions require consensus. It suffers from other 
failings as well; but the fact is the UNFCCC negotiations shape national 
and global climate action — and associated economic activity — through 
both formal and informal channels. Climate discussions in other forums 
come and go, but the UNFCCC has proven resilient, and remains the 
only universal forum for negotiating the rules. It thus retains a unique 
legitimacy.
15
 
That is not to say it dictates national obligations. To be clear: the 
negotiations are an activity of the UN, so the conventional view of 
national sovereignty is always respected. No country can be compelled 
to do anything. Given that decisions are made only by consensus, 
countries have scope to prevent decisions they object to strongly. 
Ultimately, any country can choose not to become a party to an 
agreement — as the United States (and, originally, Australia) did with the 
Kyoto Protocol — and any party can later withdraw if it chooses — as 
Canada did from the Protocol in 2011.  
Still, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol boast almost universal 
membership (the Convention has 195 member states; the Protocol 
191).
16
 Being party to either agreement entails legal obligations, primarily 
about reducing emissions of greenhouse gases within the country 
concerned, and reporting on the actions taken.
17
 These obligations are 
not specific as to the particular policies and measures to be adopted, but 
they form part of a broader and interconnected global regime that is, 
slowly but inexorably, having an impact on the economic activities that 
are the source of emissions.  
In giving operational effect to legal provisions of the two treaties, parties 
make formal decisions. Decisions are not legally binding in themselves, 
but can, over time, construct a quasi-legal understanding. Looking back, 
a series of incremental moves can be seen to establish a general 
accepted standard that guides actions by individual countries and other 
actors.
18
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In recent years, the emphasis on legal obligations has been 
progressively overtaken by the demands of universalism. In the Kyoto 
Protocol, legal form — that is, an agreement in the form of a Protocol 
containing legally binding targets — was determined in 1996, before any 
decision on what the targets themselves would be.
19
 Targets applied to a 
select list of ‘developed’ countries only. The move to universal action 
began in Bali in 2007; following the Copenhagen meeting in 2009, over 
90 developed and developing countries pledged action to reduce their 
emissions. As the Paris meeting approaches, decisions on targets will 
precede decisions on legal form. All countries have been invited to put 
forward their intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs, in 
negotiation parlance) well before the meeting convenes. Many will be 
expressed as absolute emissions targets (as in the Kyoto Protocol) but 
some will not, and some will include additional actions such as support 
for other countries’ efforts. 
Many developing and some developed countries have insisted that their 
commitments be recorded as voluntary as the quid pro quo for making 
them. This reflects the same concern Australia has long expressed: that 
differences in national circumstances mean commitments should be 
different in scope, nature, and degree.
20
 As a result, while Paris may yet 
deliver an outcome “with legal force,”
21
 it is highly unlikely that the 
national mitigation targets themselves will be legally binding. Australia’s 
initial insistence at Lima that the Paris outcome had to be legally binding 
was probably just a misstep, underlining how remote Australian ministers 
had been from the negotiations to that point. (Some observers suspect 
though that it was an attempt by the Government to set the bar for Paris 
so high that Australia could label the meeting a failure and withdraw 
even further.)
22
 
Regardless of the legal form of the Paris outcome, many countries are 
concerned with maintaining the capacity to evaluate what national 
commitments mean in terms of emissions, and to monitor 
implementation. The UNFCCC’s central reporting and review framework 
will therefore remain crucial, and it will be important for Australia to be 
able to influence the design of those mechanisms in detail.
23
 
Beyond the formal process, informal channels of influence operate too. 
The negotiations are, to a large extent, the global locus of debate on 
climate change. At the Lima COP in 2014, for example, about 180 official 
‘side-events’ were held.
24
 These were sponsored by some of the 
thousands attending the COP who do not represent governments but 
speak for intergovernmental, environment, civil society and business 
organisations, academic institutions, and other groups of varying 
influence in their communities. While not all follow the negotiations in 
detail, the COP is a marketplace for the intense exchange of ideas and 
opinions among delegates and observers. Connections are made and, 
over time, strands of different ideas intertwine, mature, and emerge into 
practice. Collaboration can, and of course does, occur outside the 
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COPs, but the COP — and to a lesser extent, the few weeks of 
intersessional negotiations throughout the year — is the annual point of 
convergence and the deadline for next steps. 
Incremental changes in norms and standards can move through the 
capillaries of diverse networks (economic, environmental, scientific, 
financing, and so on) to create expectations and guide decision-making 
over time. On specific issues, countries and their delegates can feel 
pressure from emerging orthodoxies and it can count. Following 
consistent analyses demonstrating the economic and environmental 
damage wrought by fossil fuel subsidies, and repeated calls to repeal 
them,
25
 governments are now acting — almost always at political cost. 
For example, both the previous and current Indonesian governments 
have substantially reduced subsidies on liquid fuels in the last two years, 
as has Malaysia.
26
 No doubt budgetary reasons prevail when such 
decisions are made but the frequent reiteration at COPs and elsewhere 
of the environmental value of change assists the political case. 
WHY CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS MATTER FOR 
AUSTRALIA 
The results of the formal negotiations and the many consequential or 
associated economic changes (in particular, the emissions reduction 
targets that countries set and the policies and measures they put in 
place to meet them) will profoundly alter the economic prospects of 
many industries globally — for better or for worse. The impacts will be 
felt directly by Australian firms in affected industries: companies with low-
emissions products and services may do better while those with high 
emissions may find costs are higher and customers fewer. At the level of 
the national economy these movements will show up in changes to 
Australia's terms of trade.  
These changes are an unavoidable consequence of global action to 
tackle climate change. The international community has agreed that 
global warming should be limited to less than 2 degrees Celsius above 
pre-industrial levels.
27
 Science tells us, roughly, how much additional 
greenhouse gas can be emitted if that target is to be met.
28
 This means 
the world has a ‘carbon budget’ that cannot be exceeded without 
lengthening (or extinguishing) the odds of staying below 2 degrees.  
If we assume that governments will eventually take measures to stay 
within a budget, there are inevitable consequences for the world’s 
remaining resources of fossil fuels — coal, gas, and oil. Specifically, 
much of these resources will have to remain unused. This is the basic 
logic of the ‘unburnable carbon’ and ‘carbon bubble’ arguments. A recent 
analysis on this theme by researchers at University College London 
suggests that even if technology to capture and permanently store 
carbon emissions is available, 80 per cent of the world’s current coal 
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reserves will have to remain in the ground to have a reasonable (that is, 
more than 50 per cent) chance of staying below 2 degrees.
29
  
While the international community has not agreed on a carbon budget to 
guide national efforts,
30
 investors are increasingly assessing the 
environmental and economic risks associated with carbon intensive 
investments.
31
 The UNFCCC systems and negotiations provide crucial 
input: guidance on the trajectory of global action; details of national 
targets, policies, and measures; and periodic updates on how countries 
are progressing toward their goals. Through these channels, the 
UNFCCC directly influences markets and investments, including the 
valuation of coal and other fossil fuel reserves.  
As one of the world’s biggest fossil fuel producers and exporters, 
Australia has an important stake in both when and how the world 
pursues emissions reductions.
32
 This is not to say that Australia should 
seek to delay or avoid global action — in fact, its vulnerability to climate 
change as well as its economic circumstances push squarely in the other 
direction. Partly as a result of Australia's current reliance on coal, and 
more broadly of its relatively emissions-intensive economy, it faces 
relatively greater economic adjustment than many other developed 
countries as the world reduces emissions.
33
 Timely action would spread 
the adjustment, reducing economic disruption. Further, coordinated 
action through linked markets would help minimise costs (both for 
Australia and for the world).
34
 But should efforts fragment, costs would 
increase.
35
 
Seen from this perspective, active engagement in the negotiations, to 
push for quick, decisive, and coordinated global action, should be a high-
priority economic task for the Australian Government. Instead, by 
stepping back from the negotiations, the Government implicitly 
suggested that it could avoid the required adjustment, at least for the 
present. Avoiding the task at hand is rather like a smoker ignoring health 
warnings. The problem will not go away — it will only get worse. And 
over time, failure to convincingly explain its domestic policy choices 
would leave Australia’s interests exposed, both within and beyond the 
climate negotiations.  
When, in June 2002, the Howard Government announced that Australia 
would not be ratifying the Kyoto Protocol most other governments were 
unhappy with the news, and some appeared to be deeply offended. In 
subtle ways some of that group may have paid back Australia for the 
perceived offence on other issues, often well beyond the sustainable 
development domain. These instances are difficult to evidence because 
most often linkages were not formally made (unsurprisingly, given the 
nature of diplomacy). But the authors are aware of occasions on which 
otherwise friendly governments inexplicably declined to agree to 
Australian requests. Sometimes no feedback at all was provided, 
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sometimes an eyebrow was raised, and sometimes elliptical references 
to the Kyoto Protocol were made informally.  
Worse, serious suggestions emerged from time to time for trade 
measures against Australia and other recalcitrants, particularly from 
European sources.
36
 These were not acted upon before Australian policy 
changed, and subsequently consideration of such measures has fallen 
away. In the medium term, however, should some countries be seen to 
be lagging global efforts, border tax adjustments may well be used to 
level the trade playing field. Whether such measures would be WTO-
compliant would be difficult to assess in advance; WTO requirements 
are a little like travel insurance — you sometimes cannot be sure 
whether you are covered until you make a claim. More likely than 
retribution, though, is overt peer pressure. Soon after the G20 meeting in 
Brisbane, the UK Prime Minister David Cameron commented that 
Australia would not want to be the back marker on climate change and 
“will feel pressure and want to do more.”
37
 
For these reasons, Australia’s interests are better served through active 
participation in the negotiations to ensure that the new agreement 
supports strong and urgent action, and expands opportunities for 
efficient coordinated action. Such constructive positioning would be 
consistent with Australian policy and would build Australian influence. It 
would also incidentally benefit Australia in two ways: first, by providing 
access to more cost-effective abatement opportunities in other countries; 
second, by limiting impacts on global economic activity (which provides 
the opportunities for Australian exporters and investors).  
With an eye to just these considerations, Australia played an important 
part in ensuring that provisions allowing flexibility in meeting targets were 
included in the Kyoto Protocol and that reasonable rules were agreed to 
for their implementation.
38
 Several years ago it seemed that the world 
was capitalising on these rules and heading towards efficient 
coordinated climate action. The carbon market was consolidating as the 
EU emissions trading scheme matured, the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) expanded, and other national and 
subnational schemes emerged or were foreshadowed. With the global 
financial crisis, this changed. Governments turned to the urgent issues of 
domestic economic stimulus and recovery, and demand in international 
carbon markets crashed — followed by prices. The promise of a growing 
global carbon market was dashed.  
Since then, while the number of countries using emissions trading has 
gradually increased, most developments have taken place not through 
international linkage and coordination but at the national or sub-national 
level.
39
 Political economy and other local factors — including industrial 
structures, technology capabilities, and natural resource endowments — 
mean many measures to reduce emissions are quite narrow or 
prescriptive in nature, mandating particular technologies or limiting the 
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use of particular fuels.
40
 Even within the EU, there are tightening 
restrictions on the use of emissions reductions that occur beyond EU 
borders.
41
 These trends are mirrored in Australia’s own arrangements — 
the Government’s Direct Action Plan focuses only on domestic 
emissions reductions, with no role for international units.
42
  
Domestically-focused approaches may not always be the most 
economically efficient and, given their particular origins, may not be 
suitable vehicles for international collaboration. Indeed, to the extent that 
such measures have the potential to reduce economic activity 
elsewhere, and may be developed without consultation with those so 
affected, they could become sources of international tension. Unilateral 
European efforts to reduce emissions from the aviation industry, for 
example, caused significant disturbance in relations with many other 
countries.
43
  
Paris and subsequent agreements could reinvigorate efforts to link and 
harmonise action, keeping open the prospect of lower-cost, less-
disruptive mitigation pathways. With its economic circumstances 
pressing Australia to work for strong and efficient global action, the case 
for Australia to give high priority to the negotiations is axiomatic. Two 
examples of where this is particularly the case are coal and the land 
sector. 
COAL 
Coal is an obvious target for regulation. It is a major cause of the air 
pollution that is an increasing economic drag and political challenge for 
many governments, especially in rapidly developing economies. 
Restrictions on its use therefore deliver attractive economic and climate 
co-benefits. Even where such local factors are not drivers, the relative 
emissions-intensity of coal means it can be a sitting duck when targeted 
emissions reductions are the only way forward on climate change. 
Recent changes to US power plant regulations and China’s bans on new 
coal-fired power plants in key regions may foreshadow a broader shift.
44
 
To the extent that these measures accelerate contraction of the global 
market, they increase costs for Australia. 
Moreover, non-government actors will push for restrictions even if 
governments remain cautious. The fossil fuel divestment campaign is 
gathering steam.
45
 Like other issues nurtured in the margins of the 
climate negotiations, the notion of divestment of fossil fuel assets 
seemed like a fringe idea just a few years ago. But it has now matured 
and is drifting towards the mainstream as economists, financiers, 
scientists, and proponents of ethical investment intensify their 
exchanges and build collaboration. That the risk of ‘wasted capital’ and 
‘stranded assets’
46
 is being taken seriously by the coal industry in 
particular is evidenced by the strength of reaction to local divestment 
moves such as that of the Australian National University.
47
 While 
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divestment by investors on ethical grounds may be a marginal concern, 
similar action by mainstream investors for commercial reasons would be 
of much greater moment and could prove an existential risk for some 
companies. 
The general benefits of efficient global mitigation action discussed above 
also hold true for coal. Efficient global action would change the relative 
competitiveness of producers, improving the position of lower-emission 
producers. Australia is a relatively low-emissions coal producer. So in 
the context of coordinated, linked global action, its share of global coal 
trade is likely to increase, even as the global market for coal peaks and 
declines in line with global emissions.
48
 The general risks hold true too. If 
Australia comes to be perceived as a laggard, it is not unimaginable that 
eventually its coal exports could be the focus of targeted discriminatory 
action.  
LAND SECTOR 
Since the early days of climate change negotiations the land sector has 
been a quintessential example of Australian distinctiveness. In many 
European countries, and even in North America, land-use change 
slowed or stabilised decades or even hundreds of years ago. In 
Australia, forests continue to be cleared for agriculture just as they do in 
developing countries such as Brazil, Indonesia, and Papua New Guinea. 
Emissions from land-use change (deforestation) comprised about 
24 per cent of Australia’s 1990 baseline emissions. That Australian 
governments should see their efforts to reduce land clearing as a 
measure to reduce emissions struck many Europeans as somehow 
illegitimate, even if they could not explain how.
49
  
In the end, the agreed rules were critical to Australia’s capacity to take 
on an acceptable emissions reduction target and meet it. Australia’s 
emissions — excluding the land sector — averaged 130 per cent of 
1990 levels over the first Kyoto commitment period (the years 2008 to 
2012). The land sector almost completely offset this growth: Australia’s 
emissions — including the land sector — averaged 103 per cent of 1990 
levels.
50
 The land sector was, therefore, instrumental in Australia 
meeting (indeed, surpassing) its target of 108 per cent.  
Emissions from the land sector remain important to Australia and poorly 
understood elsewhere. The issue returns whenever new commitments 
are discussed. For example, countries are currently debating which 
emissions should be counted for the purpose of ensuring that second 
commitment period targets (for the years 2013 to 2020) deliver further 
reductions relative to the first. Some parties contend that land-sector 
emissions should be excluded.
51
 If this approach were adopted, it could 
lead to the cancellation of some of Australia’s emissions rights, and have 
a material impact on Australia's target.
52
 Australia will have to continue to 
Emissions from the land 
sector remain important 
to Australia and poorly 
understood elsewhere. 
 AUSTRALIA AND CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS: AT THE TABLE, OR ON THE MENU? 
 
 11 
 
work hard to resist the proposals and preserve accounting arrangements 
consistent with its interests.
53
  
OPPORTUNITIES GOING BEGGING 
Having a position of influence within the negotiations can help shape and 
deliver the opportunities that global action creates. All delegations bring 
national experience to their positions; this informs their interventions and 
initiatives and so becomes available to other participants. The case for 
wind energy, for example, has been strengthened over time by the way 
EU delegates in particular have cited its potential contribution, corrected 
misunderstandings, and generally underlined its value.  
From time to time Australian businesspeople involved in the global 
carbon market have influenced the direction of negotiations by making 
their perspectives understood through the medium of Australian and 
other delegates. None of this is exceptional in any way but it all depends 
on access to a delegation that can ensure its voice is heard widely. 
Australian business has distinctive capabilities in many fields — for 
instance, Australian-based financial and legal services firms have long 
demonstrated innovation and agility — and will find new opportunities in 
climate change action. For this reason, a strong national presence in the 
negotiations will be an important asset. 
Another factor at play in the current negotiations is that, very slowly, the 
tide is beginning to turn against the model of development that relies on 
unfettered exploitation of natural resources.
54
 Increasingly, national 
leaders are committing their governments to strategies that aim for 
strong growth with much lower natural resource inputs (and 
consequently, lower pollution outputs). Terms such as green growth and 
the circular economy are finding their way into the mainstream — 
although this would hardly be evident to consumers of Australian media. 
These concepts and the economic opportunities they present are 
feeding back into the negotiations in a positive way and narrowing 
traditional divisions. What has been exclusively a burden-sharing debate 
is taking on a more complex and optimistic tone. Australia currently 
ranks low on global indices of low-carbon competitiveness, but has the 
endowments and other factors to improve rapidly, and to contribute to a 
virtuous circle between the global economy and the negotiations.
55
  
AUSTRALIA HAS TO MAKE ITS OWN CASE 
Australia is sometimes said to be a developed country with the economic 
structure of a developing country. This observation is intended to reflect 
the distinctive features of land-use change in Australia and the relatively 
high dependence of its economy on extractive industries. To some 
extent Australia’s approach to climate change negotiations has always 
reflected this unusual combination of economic circumstances. Australia 
has never been able to depend on other countries to cover its interests, 
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a fact that has sometimes led to Australian delegations taking positions 
at odds with usually like-minded countries.  
Australia’s distinctiveness has contributed to a consistency in its 
approach despite changes to strategies and high policy. Following the 
extended applause that accompanied the announcement at the Bali 
COP that the Rudd Government had ratified the Kyoto Protocol, an 
astute member of the South African delegation remarked to Australian 
delegates: “So you’ve changed your position; what about your policy?” 
Cynical perhaps but wise too, because Australia did not suddenly see 
the world through EU or developing country eyes. The South African 
was reframing the view often heard among diplomats and academics 
that policies may change but national interests endure. 
Australia’s push for specific land sector provisions in the Kyoto Protocol 
to take account of its national circumstances was sometimes seen by 
others as a fudge or special pleading.
56
 From the Australian perspective 
it was simply acknowledging an important source of industrial emissions: 
deforestation accounted for 24 per cent of national emissions in 1990.
57
 
Although, in the event, other countries did on occasion draw on this 
provision in minor ways, Australia was compelled to justify it repeatedly. 
It is probably the case that no other feature of the Kyoto Protocol was 
more important to Australia. Not only did it aid Australian governments to 
reduce land clearing, but, as noted above, it also made an important 
contribution to Australia’s capacity to meet its emissions reduction target. 
This was a major diplomatic achievement for Australia's delegation at 
Kyoto with an impact on the national interest of the first order. 
The importance of the provision to Australia required continued 
investment of resources in ensuring accounting rules and procedures 
would allow the provision to be operationalised successfully. This 
investment was substantial, requiring one or two negotiators at most 
international meetings and a number of people in Canberra keeping on 
top of a very complex set of technical requirements. As the preceding 
discussion of the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period shows, 
Australia must maintain its investment. 
The prospect of fragmented and inefficient global action confronted 
Australia early in the UN process; fierce debate resulted in a steady 
move towards flexibility and efficiency. Australia played a large part in 
that result, through relentless analytical input into the negotiations over 
years. It may not have won too many friends but it certainly did influence 
people.
58
 During the negotiations regarding the operational details of the 
Kyoto Protocol, Australia argued strongly for inclusion and sensible 
elaboration of what are now called the Protocol’s ‘flexibility mechanisms’ 
when most countries opposed them. Australia was not the only country 
supporting this approach — indeed, working closely with like-minded 
countries was a critical success factor. But Australia’s active 
engagement across the range of issues, even some of little national 
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importance, lent credibility to the delegation’s perspective. So too did the 
availability within the delegation of specialised expertise in economics 
and econometrics — at that stage rare among the generalist diplomats 
and environment officials who made up the larger part of most 
delegations.  
A crucial additional element was the fact that the delegation was led at 
formal meetings and other ministerial-level meetings by then Australian 
Minister for the Environment, Senator Robert Hill. It did no harm to the 
cause that he was an extraordinarily effective negotiator with a singular 
style that charmed his adversaries most just as he was trumping them. 
His abiding insistence on achieving outcomes for Australia from the 
sluggish process kept the delegation energised. Australia’s explicit focus 
on national interest (since nobody else was covering it off) was 
unpopular with many other countries throughout this period, and 
sometimes made even some of its closest collaborators, such as 
Norway, uncomfortable.
59
 But nobody doubted the weight of Australia’s 
presence and influence.  
It was this determined, comprehensive, and informed approach that led 
to acceptance of Australia’s nominated Kyoto Protocol target 
(108 per cent) even though many countries thought it was far too 
generous. A British representative said afterwards that the UK 
persuaded others that it was better to have the Australians inside the 
tent than outside because they had shown that they could not be 
ignored. 
Other issues have also required sustained effort by Australia. 
Successive Australian governments have pointed to the importance of 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) as a means of reconciling Australia’s 
fossil fuel resources and high emissions industries with a low-carbon 
future,
60
 and the importance of widespread CCS adoption over time. A 
potential means for promoting CCS was for it to be included in the Clean 
Development Mechanism, one of the Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms. 
In theory at least, this would have facilitated the uptake of CCS in 
developing countries by allowing developed countries or businesses to 
finance CCS projects in return for carbon credits. Many other 
delegations resisted this however, and although Australia was not alone, 
national interest was seen to require that Australia devote analytical and 
negotiating resources to the task over an extended period.
61
 
TOWARDS FULL ENGAGEMENT 
The surest way for Australia to secure its national interests in the climate 
change negotiations would be to move decisively to policy settings that 
prioritise a global solution to climate change. This would match the 
expectations of Australia’s partners, who are aware of the country’s 
vulnerability to climate change and that its endowments of natural 
resources include those necessary for low-carbon prosperity.
62
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Within the confines of the negotiations, ministerial attendance at the 
Lima COP and the decision to support the GCF have already 
strengthened Australia’s hand. Three key elements — Ministerial 
leadership, a strong negotiating team, and active engagement in 
preparations for Paris — could sustain momentum and help restore 
Australian influence.  
MINISTERIAL LEADERSHIP 
A key element of successful reengagement with international climate 
change negotiations that defends and advances Australia’s national 
interests will be ministerial participation at key meetings. Ideally at each 
such meeting the Foreign Minister — or another minister in her absence 
— would convene her Umbrella Group colleagues to review 
developments and consider possible joint action. This would 
demonstrate Australian sensitivity to the political importance of the issue.  
The foundations of the decision not to send a minister to the 2013 COP 
in Warsaw were laid by the changes in administrative arrangements that 
followed the election that year. The Environment Minister was given 
responsibility for most domestic climate change policy while the 
international negotiations became the province of Foreign Minister Julie 
Bishop.
63
 Encumbered as they are with extremely heavy travel 
commitments for the host of other issues before them, foreign ministers 
rarely attend COPs.
64
 This may be one reason why in other countries 
where foreign affairs departments have lead responsibility and always 
head delegations at officials’ level, the climate change or environment 
minister may lead when ministers are convened. This is the usual 
Japanese practice, for example. 
Having had no ministerial heft in Warsaw, the Australian delegation in 
Lima last year found itself with both the Foreign Minister and the Trade 
Minister. Both have strong portfolio interests in the agenda and both 
have strong track records as negotiators. If the Foreign Minister 
continues to lead Australian delegations throughout 2015, Australia will 
be in a strong position at the COP in Paris in December. It will be 
important that she also attend meetings of the Major Economies Forum, 
an influential dialogue led by the United States (in which the Secretary of 
State will probably participate), as well as the several meetings at 
ministerial level that will likely precede the COP.
65
 This will be a heavy 
schedule for the Foreign Minister and explains in part why she will see 
few of her counterparts on the circuit. But a foreign minister brings a 
particular perspective that links climate change to other global 
developments, and this will help her negotiating partners broaden the 
context of their work. 
Should the Foreign Minister not be able to meet the demands of the 
Paris preparatory process, a Plan B could involve Environment Minister 
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Greg Hunt, an accomplished international negotiator well-known to many 
of his counterparts. This would not be unusual for the Australian 
delegation. Previous ambassadors for the environment reported to both 
the Foreign Minister and the Environment Minister. This was an effective 
means of ensuring the cross-government coordination that is a primary 
requirement for success, both at home and abroad. 
A STRONG NEGOTIATING TEAM 
The Minister needs to be supported by an effective team of officials, 
which is the right size for the job. The current Ambassador for the 
Environment Peter Woolcott is one of Australia’s outstanding diplomats 
but there are too few officials committed to international climate change 
negotiations to cover the breadth of Australia’s interests. Day-to-day 
diplomatic exchange on the climate negotiations is impossible, as the 
UNFCCC secretariat is based in Bonn rather than a major diplomatic 
city. The climate change working year is therefore compressed into a 
few sessions of a week or two each. Meetings commence at around 
7am and conclude around 11pm, six days a week. (Informal meetings fill 
most Sundays.) While some may not matter much, others lead to 
important decisions or produce crucial inputs into final decisions made 
by ministers in the high-level sessions that conclude each COP.  
The range of meetings is effectively an atomised version of the agenda 
as a whole. Participation in most is essential for a delegation that wants 
to maintain a complete picture of the whole and the capacity to influence 
outcomes on those issues of greatest interest. Even with a delegation of 
25 or so — about the average at previous COPs — a sharp sense of 
priority is required to ensure that the most important meetings are 
covered. At Lima the delegation was only 14 strong, not counting those 
directly supporting ministerial attendance.   
A delegation of reasonable size is also required to ensure that an 
adequate range of expertise is available. Economics expertise is no 
longer unusual but is seen as essential in most delegations; the process 
is probably the most important multilateral economic negotiation 
currently underway. Australia was one of the first countries to deploy a 
specialised climate change legal unit, a step that enabled the delegation 
to elaborate (in 2009) a method of harmonising the different types of 
commitments being considered for inclusion in an agreement that is 
conceptually very close to the one adopted for the Paris meeting. At a 
crisis point in the Copenhagen meeting Australia was called on to assist 
because, as those coordinating the resolution of the crisis remarked, the 
Australian legal team was the best at the COP. Many aspects of the 
negotiations are highly specialised and a delegation without the 
necessary expertise can really only look on as decisions are made. 
Forestry, marine science, energy technology, aviation, and soil carbon 
are just some of the issues that call for detailed attention from time to 
time.
66
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CONVENE A PREPARATORY MEETING 
In the year preceding a COP of real moment such as that in Paris, 
intense consultation and coordination on key issues are features of the 
preparatory process. As host and president of the COP, France will now 
be finalising its strategy for building momentum and promoting 
consensus. Australia could play a useful role by offering to host a 
meeting in Australia to address a particular aspect of the preparatory 
task. This could be a meeting of countries of the region, or of countries 
particularly interested in an issue of importance for the Paris meeting. In 
the latter case, active Australian problem-solving would be welcomed 
generally. Such an initiative could lead to an Australian delegate being 
asked to chair the relevant negotiating group during the COP; an 
opportunity to return Australia to a seat on the podium. 
Australia might also consider a policy agenda beyond the climate 
change negotiations themselves that strengthens the alignment between 
Australia’s climate, economic, and trade objectives. Recently APEC and 
the WTO have agreed on steps to facilitate trade in environmental goods 
and services. Australia might support these moves with practical action 
that helps accelerate the processes already underway. This could lead 
to a better appreciation of the upsides of climate action in which more 
liberal trade plays a stronger role.  
CONCLUSION 
The current climate change negotiations are of great importance for 
Australia. They will shape the actions countries take, the resulting 
economic opportunities and risks for Australia, and, ultimately, the extent 
of climate risks and impacts the nation faces. Few if any other 
international negotiations invoke such consequences. In no other 
multilateral process are Australia’s interests so distinctive. The UN 
negotiations and related intergovernmental activities should be in the 
very top category of the Government’s and DFAT’s priorities. A year and 
much influence have been forgone. Early signs at Lima that the 
Government has recognised the need to lift its game are welcome but 
much further effort will be necessary for Australia to command the 
standing and influence required to secure its interests. 
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ACRONYMS 
ABARE 
Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
(now called the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics and Sciences, ABARES) 
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
APPCDC Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate 
CCS Carbon capture and storage 
CDM Clean Development Mechanism 
COP Conference of the Parties (to the UNFCCC) 
EU European Union 
G20 
Group of Twenty, an international forum for the governments 
and central bank governors from 20 major economies: 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European 
Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, 
Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States. 
GCF Green Climate Fund 
INDC Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
MEF Major Economies Forum 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
UNGA United Nations General Assembly 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
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